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RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ACCOUNTING PROFESSION
FOR ADEQUATE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE

One of the most fundamental characteristics of
our economy is its broad base of financial resources.
This growing, progressing, private enterprise system

requires a continuous influx of capital in immense amounts.

In the United States this is provided not just by big
investors.

In addition to the more than 26 million people

who own stock directly., other millions supply sums through

banks., insurance companies, mutual funds and the like.
Our system is called private enterprise, but
the word "private” is used really to mean ”non-government.”
You could say that the system is actually one of public

enterprise because it depends so essentially upon the
public for its financing.
Clearly such economy can flourish only if rooted

in public confidence.

Let that confidence sour, and the

entire system would change drastically.
Public confidence in the companies that perform

most of our industrial production, power generation, dis

tribution and transportation rests on information -- largely
financial information.

The public has the right to know

enough about the financial affairs of a company to permit

prudent investments to be made.

And when it comes to

public disclosure of financial information, American companies
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-- sometimes under the prodding of government but more

often in recognition of their own self-interest -- have

done a good job.
Corporate managers, including boards of directors,
have the basic responsibility for providing financial
information to the public.

But other segments of society

share the responsibility to some extent.

Some reporting

requirements are prescribed by government regulatory
agencies -- the Securities and Exchange Commission being
the agency with the broadest jurisdiction.

In fact, the

purpose of the Securities Acts is to provide full and fair

disclosure of the character of securities sold in inter
state and foreign commerce.

Stock exchanges also have been alert in requiring
financial disclosures by listed companies.

Together, the

SEC and the exchanges have relied heavily on the accounting
profession to add credibility to financial information.

There are in turn two steps to the work of the
accounting profession in carrying out its responsibilities

for financial communication.
First, the organized profession has assumed the

responsibility for establishing accounting principles on
which financial statements are based.

The Accounting

Principles Board of the American Institute of Certified
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Public Accountants has undertaken this role by issuing
its formal Opinions which furnish guidelines for practicing
CPAs.

Second, the independent CPA follows these guide
lines in expressing to investors and the general public
his professional opinion on the fairness of the financial

statements presented by management.

If the CPA believes

that the statements do not meet his profession’s standards

and he will be obliged to note an exception in his report,
management will usually follow the accounting principles

he recommends.

Ordinarily the SEC and stock exchanges will

not accept financial statements that contain anything other

than the auditor’s formal endorsement.
But the accounting profession is responsible
only for financial statements that are covered by the opinion

of an independent CPA.

Customarily many additional financial

disclosures are made by corporations through various channels.
The annual report is one of the most important communications

to stockholders and it contains financial statements and
a wide variety of other information.

Since the years when annual reports were, to
put it mildly, laconic, these corporate publications have

really bloomed.

Many of them contain an extensive narrative

of what went on in the company during the year.
filled with charts and graphs and photos.

They are
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As the stockholding public has increased, not

only in numbers but in awareness and sophistication, it
has come to want -- perhaps more than striking pictures

of production lines and laboratories -- complete and
understandable financial data.

As this demand became more widespread, it grew

gradually into outspoken criticism of the lack of useful
and understandable information in corporate financial

statements.

In some instances, expressions of ridicule

were directed at financial reports., indicating that some
were in fact meaningless.
This criticism, originating in the press and

in the financial community itself,
attacked the different
ways companies could report the same kind of transactions.
These included such items as extraordinary gains and losses;

acquisitions that could be treated as poolings of interest
or as purchases; different methods of handling research
and development costs; the charging of pension costs on a

pay-as-you-go basis.
The demand for greater "comparability" of earnings

figures among different companies was on the increase.

The

investing public no longer was content just to have a company
follow its own accounting procedures consistently from year
to year.

The trend was toward standardization under which
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all companies would follow the same procedures in the

same circumstances, bringing about an elimination of un
necessary obstacles to comparison of earnings of different
companies.
The accounting profession came in for its share

of the complaints.

The variety of alternative accounting

methods led some critics to claim that managements could

choose the one that made their earnings appear the best.
Proper as this may have been under the circumstances , the

investor was left in a state of confusion when he attempted

to compare the earnings of one company with another, even
in the same industry.
The dynamic growth of industry and the extensive
financial complexes that have emerged during the past two

decades have created new conditions in which many existing
accounting principles have become outmoded or superfluous.
Today the intelligent investor, the security analyst and

others are insistent on receiving complete and understandable
disclosure of the financial information they need to make
their investment decisions.

In 1959, the accounting profession realized
that greater attention had to be applied to the problem.

It was then that the American Institute of Certified

Public Accountants established the Accounting Principles Boards
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and backed it up with a full-time research staff, to
undertake a concentrated study of corporate financial
accounting practices.

Later, the governing Council of the Institute
put forth a statement of objectives which declared that

"variations in treatment of accounting items generally
should be confined to those justified by substantial

differences in factual circumstances."

The Council also

resolved that Institute members, in their capacity as

independent auditors, should see to it that departures
from opinions of the Accounting Principles Board were
disclosed, either in footnotes or in the audit reports.

Earlier this month Council took another step toward

strengthening this requirement by recommending that it
be incorporated into the profession's Code of Ethics.

Membership of the Institute is expected to adopt the

recommendation next fall, after which a member who fails
to see that departures from APB Opinions are disclosed

will be subject to disciplinary actions, which may

include expulsion from the Institute.
Creation of accounting principles is a process

of reason, carried out by an elected group of the profess
ion's leaders.

The principles are intellectual concepts,

not laws of nature like those discovered and enunciated
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by the physical sciences.

Moreover, accounting principles

are aimed at moving targets that can shift with the changing

conditions of economic development.
As the business community undergoes change and

invents new techniques, the accounting profession evolves
new standards and principles that will enable business
to report fairly to the public.

Sometimes the profession

is able to anticipate change., and is able to have the
right accounting standard available at the right time.

In other instances., the change takes place and accountants
have to catch up with the reporting complexities change
has brought about.
The Accounting Principles Board consists of 18

leading CPAs., who are appointed by the governing Council
of the American Institute.

The procedure the Board follows

in preparing an Opinion is designed to elicit the view
points of all concerned -- corporate management., the

financial community, the academic world, government agencies
and the accounting profession.

As a proposed Opinion moves

from the research stage through discussion and drafting,
consultations are held with key groups involved, including

those from industries which will be most affected.

Before

final action, several thousand copies of an exposure draft
are circulated for comment.

Redrafting usually occurs in
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the light of the comments received.

Finally, the Board

votes on the proposal, and a two-thirds affirmative vote
is required to establish an official Opinion.

So you can see, the making of an Opinion is
not something done lightly.

And -- of great importance

in my view -- it is done within the private sector.

The

work of the Accounting Principles Board is an example of

the private sector taking action in the public interest

which, in the absence of such self-regulation, would have

to be performed by government.
In the past few years the Accounting Principles
Board has made considerable progress toward codifying
generally accepted accounting principles and reducing

unwarranted differences in accounting practices.

One of

the Board's major decisions is its Opinion 15, issued

earlier this month, dealing with earnings per share.

It

is effective for fiscal periods beginning after December
31, 1968.
By way of background., let me say that the

accounting profession has been preaching for years that
investors should not rely solely on earnings per share

figures in making buy-or-sell decisions in the stock market.

Rather, they should study a company's financial statements
as a whole.

However, there was no getting people out of
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the habit of applying a times-earnings ratio as a means

of judging market price.

Most stockbuyers just don't

take the time for fuller analysis.

In light of this stubborn fact, the accounting
profession set about to refine the earnings per share
figure and to make it as realistic and objective as
possible.

This was at the time, a few years back, when

the merger movement was gaining momentum, and many hasty
marriages were taking place.

Some of the mergers resulted

in an exchange* of securities so imaginatively conceived
that earnings per share computed by the traditional method

did not tell the full story.
The same type of complicated securities was

being issued in refinancing transactions.

The effect

of this was that earnings per share., computed by the
traditional method, could be enhanced simply by issuance
of the security, even though there was really no change

in substance because the security was virtually the same
as common stock.

It was into this thicket of legitimate, although
often confusing, financial maneuvering that the Account
ing

Principles Board walked.

It emerged in 1966 with a land

mark measure, Opinion 9 on Reporting the Results of

Operations.
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One of the things this Opinion did was to

recommend that the earnings per share figure be shown
on the face of the income statement.

Previously,
the

figure appeared only in the unaudited portion of annual

reports, such as the president’s letter or the highlights,
and therefore was not subject to surveillance by the

auditor.
A second major point was the recommendation

that earnings per share be calculated so as to reveal
the potential dilutive effect of convertible securities,

rather than basing the calculation only on the number of

common shares outstanding.

It recommended that companies

subject to potential dilution of earnings attributable

to common stock should give two earnings per share figures
-- one a so-called primary earnings per share, and the
other a fully diluted figure.

The latter would show what

the earnings would be if all convertible securities and

other contingent issues were to be exchanged for common
stock.

Some companies adopted these recommendations
at once.

But it was soon evident that further guidelines

were called for and a greater tightening of standards was
needed.

This resulted in the new Opinion 15 on earnings
per share which has just been finalized.
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The new Opinion changed what was previously a

recommendation into a requirement that earnings per share
be reported on the income statement.

This means that if

a company does not present earnings per share in its

income statement, the auditor will be obliged to disclose
that the omission is a departure from accounting standards.

Equally important,
the new Opinion spells out
the manner in which the dilution effects should be determined

for such securities as convertible preferred stock,

convertible debentures, stock purchase warrants and options.
Nearly everyone agrees that some convertible

securities have so many of the attributes of common stock

that they ought logically to be included with common in
computing earnings per share.

The problem was how to draw

the line between gimmicky securities, which might give

rise to misleading reporting, and solid senior securities.

Of all the securities that are used in so-called

package deals, perhaps the most volatile and unpredictable
is the stock purchase warrant.

A warrant has no voting

rights., pays no dividend., has no claim on a company's
assets -- yet has a claim on earnings.

Berle and Means, in their classic document,

The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
noted this

as far back as 1932.

They described warrants as "conduits
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through which.

.

.earnings may flow from existing share

holders into other groups of shareholders. "
We can recall the widespread use of warrants

in the 1920s, as, for example., in the case of American
& Foreign- Power., whose warrants during 1929 sold at a
high of 175.

When AFP was recapitalized in the early

1950s, the warrants had a value of zero.
Yet until now., warrants were ignored in computing
earnings per share.'

This is one of the reasons warrants

have been so popular with latter-day empire builders who
find them helpful in satisfying their urge to merge.

APB Opinion 15 provides that warrants, and options

as well, should be regarded as common stock equivalents
until they are exercised or expire.

Where warrants are

outstanding, earnings per share should be computed by
adding to the common shares outstanding the number of

shares issuable upon exercise of the warrants, less the

number of common shares that could be purchased with the
proceeds from exercise of the warrants.

Still further

dilution must be recognized for warrant issues for exercise

of common stock in excess of 20% of the number of shares
outstanding.

In this case all of the shares over 20%

must be considered outstanding and the proceeds from
exercise must be assumed to be applied first to reduce
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corporate debt and next, if any proceeds remain, to purchase

government securities or commercial paper.
It is not the Board's intention or desire to

block the use of warrants.

What it seeks is appropriate

recognition of their heavy dilutive potential in reporting
earnings per share.
In some cases, warrants have been issued in
connection with takeovers, and the issuing companies have
tried to apply pooling accounting to the transactions.

The accounting profession has now prohibited this practice.
Other companies have issued warrants to existing
stockholders for nothing, simply as an added attraction.

The New York Stock Exchange, with the agreement of the

accounting profession, put the brakes on this by requiring

that warrants be accounted for as if they were stock
dividends.

Opinion 15 also deals with the dilution effect
upon earnings of other convertible securities, either

debentures or preferred stocks.

It makes the determination

of common stock equivalency of such issues only at time

of issuance.

If the convertible securities have a cash

yield of less than two-thirds of the prime bank interest

rate, they will be regarded as equivalents of common stock,

and must be included with the common shares in determining
the primary earnings per share figure.

-14-

In addition to warrants and options and convertible

securities which are considered to be common stock equivalents,
other convertible securities and contingent issuances of

common stock may have a potentially dilutive effect on
earnings per share.

If so, this further potential dilution

must be taken into account in determining a second or fully
diluted earnings per share figure.

Let us turn now to an accounting question associated

with mergers.
As you know., when one company acquires another,

the acquirer usually pays more for the company acquired

than the net value of the latter's assets as carried on
the balance sheet at their historical cost.

This difference

between the so-called book value of the acquired company
and what is paid for it., is designated as "goodwill. "

Now., an acquisition transaction can be accounted
for by one of two sets of rules -- as a purchase or as a

pooling-of-interests.

These rules are not mutually ex

clusive for, under certain conditions, it may be possible
to account for a transaction partially as a purchase and
partially

as a pooling.

In purchase accounting, the assets acquired are
recorded on the books of the acquiring corporation at the
price paid for them.

But under a pooling-of-interests,
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the book value of the acquired company is simply added

to the book value of the continuing company, and the

amount that was paid for the merged company, over and above
book value, is ignored.

Thus the acquiring company may

be able to show a large increase in earnings without

reflecting the cost of obtaining these earnings.

Currently there is general agreement, both
inside and outside the profession, that the pooling-of-

interests concept has been used too loosely.

It has

encouraged the merger movement by allowing companies
to exaggerate the value of security packages offered in

tenders without having to worry about sanctifying these
values by placing them on their books to reflect the

transaction that took place.
Also, with pooling accounting, an acquiring
company can sell investments or other assets which are
undervalued on the books of the acquired company and report

instant earnings of sizable amounts.
earnings magic possible, it is no

With this kind of

wonder that soundly-

managed, conservatively-financed companies of all sizes

have become targets for takeovers.
The APB is working on this problem, and is

concentrating on issuing an Opinion by the end of this
year.
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First, the Board will have to deal with the

question of whether pooling-of-interests accounting should
be acceptable under any circumstances.

A research study

prepared as background material for the Board's deliberations
recommends that pooling be abandoned entirely and all
business acquisitions be treated as purchases.
If pooling is to survive, there will have to

be tight and workable criteria for determining when it is
appropriate.

Purchase accounting presents additional problems,
whether or not pooling survives.

When a company is pur

chased by use of equity securities rather than cash or
debt, cost of the purchased assets may be an elusive concept.
Market value of the securities issued may be a good

indicator of cost in some cases.

Those with a conservative

bent may cringe, however., at the thought of capitalizing

as an asset huge amounts of goodwill that would result
from applying highly inflated market values of some volatile
stock issues.

So if pooling is denied, the Board will

have to come up with a realistic answer to the determination

of cost of goodwill arising in equity security purchases.
But the biggest problem in purchase accounting
has to do with writing it off.

Under today's rules,

goodwill can be either carried as an asset indefinitely
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or written off by systematic charges against income over
a period of years.

The research study proposes a third

treatment -- writing it off immediately upon acquisition

by a charge to capital surplus or retained earnings.

As

to future earnings,
this would produce the same effect
-- or non-effect -- as pooling-of-interests accounting.
But many accountants, including the staff of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, have recommended

the amortization of goodwill against future earnings in
all cases.

The problems in this area never end.

For an

arbitrary amortization period would have to be specified,

as it is nearly impossible to make a reasonable estimate
of a "useful life" of goodwill.

Goodwill amortization is anathema to mergerminded managements -- especially so because of the

double impact on earnings due to its non-deductibility
for federal income tax purposes.

Tax deduction is denied

even if the acquisition transaction giving rise to the
goodwill is a taxable transaction.

There is no doubt that compulsory capitalization
and amortization of goodwill would greatly curtail the

corporate marriage movement.

Marriages would be fewer

and sounder, and perhaps happier.
The merger movement has brought with it demands
for disclosure of operating results of separate product
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lines within a diversified company.

Often conglomerates

have swallowed large companies which are major producers
in their industry.

Without continuing disclosure of such

a line of business, important industry statistics become

no longer available to the public arid investors in con

glomerates are deprived of knowledge about relative con

tribution to total results made by separable diverse
operations.
The Accounting Principles Board proposed two

years ago that highly diversified companies undertake

an experimental reporting of revenues and income by
broad industry segments as a means of helping investors
appraise corporate operations.

The SEC is about to

issue regulations requiring product line reporting in

registration statements.

As a result of these and other

pressures, voluntary disclosures have appeared in many

1968 annual reports.

The Accounting Principles Board is

now considering the need for an Opinion dealing with

product-line figures in financial statements reported
on by CPAs.
Less widely known than the Institute’s accounting

pronouncements are those on auditing procedures.

As

statements on auditing procedure are intended for the

guidance of members in carrying out examinations of
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financial statements, they have not attracted the public
notice that Opinions of the APB have.

The latter have

a very obvious impact on the reporting of corporate

results.
obtrusive.

Statements on auditing procedure are less
Nevertheless, these statements are of great

.

importance in assuring the performance of audit work

according to high standards.
The Institute’s committee on auditing procedure
has issued forty statements, including the one which

defines the ten generally accepted auditing standards.

Several more statements are in a draft stage.

They

cover many subjects, including the subsequent discovery

of facts existing prior to the auditor’s report, negative
assurances, extensions of auditing procedure and revision

of the short form report.

The statement on subsequent discovery is about

to be exposed for comment.

You may recognize the situation

involved in it. It deals with the problem of making

adequate disclosure of information discovered after issuance

of financial statements which would call for correction

of the statements.

Unless a professional standard is

established, the auditor has no guidance for making such
a disclosure.

He may go to management with the recom

mendation that full disclosure be made of the subsequently
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discovered information.

If management chooses not to

disclose., he is torn between his duty to keep a client's
affairs confidential and the need for public disclosure.

We in the accounting profession function within

strict ground rules.

As professionals, we are bound by

a Code of Ethics, which requires that we be intellectually
and -financially independent of clients.

As independent

auditors, we work with corporate managements who are our

clients.

Yet our responsibility is to the company's

stockholders, to the broad investing public, credit grantors
and the regulatory agencies.
Our channel to the stockholders, however, is

only through the management.

In some instances, this

lack of direct communication between the independent
auditor and the stockholders has created a difficult

situation for the auditor.

The profession's Code of Ethics

binds the CPA to silence in the face of a management that
is either recalcitrant or, as is more likely the case,
has failed to understand what the CPA is attempting to
accomplish in the public interest.

Two years ago the profession took an affirmative

step to alleviate this situation to some degree.

The

Executive Committee of the American Institute, in a formal
statement, recommended that publicly-owned corporations
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appoint committees of outside directors, who are not

officers or employees, to nominate the independent
auditors and work with the auditors in the course of their

engagement.

This provides the auditor with direct contact

with impartial members of the board of directors who, in
turn, are directly responsible to the stockholders.

It

creates also a better understanding among all of the

directors about the role of the CPA and his own responsi
bilities and obligations.
This same statement of the Executive Committee

recommended that when a company changes auditors, the

replaced firm should be given the opportunity to appear
at the next annual meeting of the company’s stockholders

to comment, if the firm so desires, on the reasons for
its replacement.

The public has the right to know whether

differences over financial communication were involved

in making the change.
So steady progress is being made on virtually
all sides.

In its efforts to improve corporate financial

reporting, the accounting profession has encountered some

back-fire from companies that feel they have been treated
unfairly.

But most managements have been responding

favorably to the new accounting trends, recognizing as they

do that the changes are in the public interest and therefore
contribute to public confidence in corporate financial
statements.
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The Board Chairman of one of the largest

companies in the country

wrote us not long ago, saying:

"I am glad to see that the Accounting Principles Board

is making progress in the search for an acceptance of

sound accounting principles."
Working in concert to provide the public with

the improved type of corporate reporting needed to satisfy

the public’s right to know, the accounting profession
and the business community, I am certain, will continue

to strengthen and enrich the American economy for the

benefit of society as a whole.

